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Abstract 
The rampant increase in frequency and complexity of cyber-attacks against manufacturing firms, has 
motivated the development of identification and mitigation techniques for cyber-physical vulnerabilities 
in manufacturing. While the field of cybersecurity assessment approaches is expansive, there is no 
literature aimed at assessing cyber-physical vulnerabilities for manufacturing systems. In response, this 
paper provides a framework for systematically identifying cyber-physical vulnerabilities in 
manufacturing systems. The proposed approach employs intersection mapping to identify cyber-
physical vulnerabilities in manufacturing. A cyber-physical vulnerability impact analysis using decision 
trees then provides the manufacturer with a stoplight scale between low, medium, and high levels of 
cyber-physical vulnerability for each analyzed production process. The stoplight scale allows 
manufacturers to interpret assessment results in an intuitive way. Finally, the paper provides a case study 
of the proposed approach at an applied manufacturing research facility and provides general 
recommendations to securing similar facilities from cyber-physical attacks. 
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1 Background and Motivation 
With advancements in networking and internet technologies, cyber-attacks on physical systems are 
becoming a growing phenomenon. Perhaps the most infamous cyber-attack on a physical system was 
the “Stuxnet” virus. Between late 2009 and early 2010, Stuxnet allegedly destroyed as many as 1,000 
Iranian high-speed centrifuges used for uranium enrichment. Specifically, the life-spans of these 
centrifuges were significantly reduced by periodically changing their rotational speeds (Albright et al., 
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2010; Vincent et al., 2015). This attack was successful because it was able to display misleading 
equipment readings (reading indicated no problems) to operators (Cherry, 2011). 
 Examples of other cyber-attacks are quite numerous, expanding across a variety of fields. Recent 
cyber-attacks include the Target data breach in December 2013 (Target, 2014), the hacking of Sony 
Pictures Entertainment (Lee, 2014) in November 2014, and acquiring private customer information from 
Anthem Health Insurance in December 2014 (Anthem, Inc., 2015). Other examples also involved cyber-
attacks on a physical system, such as the “logic bomb” that was reportedly inserted in the Trans-Siberian 
pipeline’s control software to abnormally change the pumps and valves settings, causing a massive 
explosion in 1982 (Rost & Glass, 2011). These examples demonstrate that no system is beyond the reach 
by cyber-attackers, and manufacturing systems are no exception. 
Over the last few years, manufacturing has been one of the most targeted sectors for cyber-attacks 
(Symantec, 2014; Symantec, 2015) by spear-phishing attacks†. In addition, the critical manufacturing 
sector accounted for the most security incidents reported to the Industrial Control Systems Cyber 
Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) in the past year (ICS-CERT, 2015). Attacks such as these 
traditionally aim at gaining unauthorized access to information or valuable trade secrets (Deloitte, 2014). 
However, with the evolving nature of manufacturing systems, the threat of cyber-physical attacks 
(cyber-attacks affecting physical systems) against manufacturing is of significant concern.  
The opportunities for these cyber-physical attacks are also exacerbated by the Internet of Things 
(IoT), which has resulted in a rampant expansion of networked devices across every sector (Evans, 
2011), including manufacturing. In addition, internet-based Computer Aided Engineering (CAE) 
support tools, such as cloud computing and software as a service (SaaS) are being adopted across 
manufacturing. This opens new unwanted “doors” for malicious attacks into manufacturing systems. 
Recent case studies, conducted at Virginia Tech, have shown the ease in which such cyber-physical 
attacks can be executed. In the first case study (Wells et al., 2014), tool path files were modified in a 
subtractive manufacturing operation, while the design files for an additive manufacturing process were 
altered in the second case study (Strum et al., 2014). Examples of the undetected outcome of cyber-
physical attacks can include defective products as well as not meeting required design specifications. In 
addition, the financial consequences of such an attack could be devastating due to delaying a product’s 
launch, ruining equipment, increasing warranty costs, losing customer trust, or causing physical harm 
to an employee or end user. 
Recently, it was reported that the median number of days between the onset of a cyber-attack and its 
detection in an organization was over 200 days (Mandiant, 2014). Additionally, 69% of these attacks 
were not discovered by the victims themselves, but by third parties such as law enforcement agencies 
and customers (Mandiant, 2014). Currently, there is little emphasis placed on cyber-physical security in 
present manufacturing environments, as cybersecurity for manufacturing is commonly treated through 
pure information technology. However, given the cyber-physical nature of advanced manufacturing, 
attacks against these systems cannot be mitigated by traditional cybersecurity approaches (National 
Defense Industrial Association (NDIA), 2014; Vincent et al., 2015). The threat of cyber-physical attacks 
on manufacturing is not being addressed in the manufacturing industry leaving facilities and entire 
supply chains vulnerable to a barrage of cyber-physical attacks. 
There exists a need to develop a manufacturing specific approach to identifying cyber-physical 
vulnerabilities. As a first step, manufacturers need to understand how their systems could be 
compromised by cyber-physical attacks; in order to better secure them.  Accordingly, this paper aims to 
identify those vulnerabilities through a systematic cyber-physical vulnerability‡ assessment approach 
for manufacturing systems. In addition to identifying and assessing vulnerabilities within the 
manufacturing environment, the proposed approach is the first of a five-step cyber-physical security 
                                                          
† A spear-phishing attack is a targeted e-mail scam aiming to access sensitive data, steal valuable information, or install 
malware on compromised computers. (Kaspersky, 2015) 
‡ A vulnerability is defined as any flaw, weakness, or gap in a system’s design, implementation, or operation that can be 
exploited by an intruder to violate the system’s security policy (Sadowsky et al., 2003) 
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protocol: identifying and assessing vulnerabilities, protection, attack detection, response strategy, and 
recovery protocol (NIST, 2014). The proposed approach provides manufacturing enterprises with a 
method to adhere to cybersecurity frameworks, such as the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) (NIST, 2014). Finally, implementing a vulnerability assessment approach will raise 
awareness among industry practitioners regarding the existence of malicious cyber-physical attacks and 
their potentially serious consequences. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related work in the field of 
vulnerability assessment and relevant commercial tools for cyber-physical systems. Section 3 presents 
the details of the proposed cyber-physical vulnerability assessment approach. Section 4 implements the 
proposed approach in a case study within an applied research facility. Finally, Section 5 provides our 
conclusions and future work. 
2 Literature Review  
This section discusses related efforts of assessing cyber-physical system vulnerabilities within the 
academic and commercial realms. A vulnerability assessment presents a common framework to assess 
and quantify the impact a vulnerability may have on a system (Mell et al., 2006); it should not be 
confused with risk analysis. A traditional risk analysis approach involves an investigative audit to verify 
the presence of security systems and to validate their usefulness (Cerullo & Cerullo, 1994). Together, 
vulnerability assessments and risk analysis reports allow an organization to view their security stance at 
a given time.  
There exists only limited research within the field of vulnerability assessment for cyber-physical 
systems. Baker (2005) developed a three-step process for cyber vulnerability assessment and risk 
analysis methods for cyber-physical systems (Baker, 2005). The first step consists of understanding the 
organizational structure. Second, the organization determines failure modes and identifies potential 
consequences. Lastly, the organization implements improvements (Baker, 2005). The main issue of this 
approach is the lack of clarity on how to correctly identify vulnerabilities, which results in a pure risk 
analysis method rather than a vulnerability assessment and risk analysis method.  
Ten et al. (2008) developed a vulnerability assessment approach for industrial control systems, 
specifically, Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Systems (Ten et al., 2008). Their 
assessment was motivated by a requirement passed by the North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation (NERC) to identify cyber vulnerabilities in electrical power systems. Adhering to the 
NERC requirement has proven difficult due to the increasing level of interconnectedness in electrical 
power and SCADA systems (Ten et al., 2008). The goal of their approach was to provide a systematic 
vulnerability assessment at the system, scenario, and access point levels, fulfilling the requirements of 
the NERC standard (Ten et al., 2008). That NERC requirement is similar to a US manufacturing mandate 
by President Obama in 2013 (Obama, 2013). However, the approach of Ten et al. (Ten et al., 2008) 
cannot identify vulnerabilities within the manufacturing system as it focuses solely on industrial control 
(SCADA) systems which make up only a small portion of the entire manufacturing landscape. 
More recently, Hutchins et al. (2015) expanded the risk management frontier for manufacturers to 
include cybersecurity risks and vulnerabilities. Their paper outlined a framework for identifying 
cybersecurity risks in manufacturing (Hutchins et al., 2015). Their approach is motivated by the inability 
to identify and assess cyber-risk in manufacturing through existing risk management approaches. Their 
paper deals strictly with the cyber domain, specifically with the flow and transfer of data through 
interconnected processes and machines (Hutchins et al., 2015). While providing a structured approach 
to identifying cybersecurity risks in manufacturing, their paper does not consider cyber-physical security 
in its assessment approach, which includes the securing of products or processes that arise from the 
interconnectivity of the manufacturing enterprise. 
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With respect to the commercialization of vulnerabilities assessments and audits, the current 
cybersecurity market is rich in varying methods and approaches for identifying cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities within an organization. Many of the common tools are created at research institutions, 
such as Carnegie Mellon University’s Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation 
(OCTAVE) (Caralli et al., 2007). Others are created from government and federal agencies, such as the 
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council’s (FFIEC) assessment tool (FFIEC, 2015) and the 
NIST Cybersecurity Framework (NIST, 2014).  
The OCTAVE assessment strives to assist organizations in aligning their security activities with 
overall organizational goals (Caralli et al., 2007). This approach uses a multidisciplinary team from 
within the organization to complete a series of survey-based asset related questions to assess the current 
levels of cybersecurity within the organization. The FFIEC Cybersecurity Assessment Tool acts more 
as a reference guide to an organization’s level of security from cyber-attacks and can be repeated as 
needed to assess progress (FFIEC, 2015). The FFIEC tool focuses on defining and assessing the 
cybersecurity risks an organization might experience and brings together board members and 
shareholders to agree upon the level of security and risk the company is willing to incur.  
The NIST Cybersecurity Framework was developed in response to the executive order that mandated 
NIST to proceed in implementing a cybersecurity framework that would assist the nation’s industries 
with fortifying their infrastructure in order to be more resilient to cyber-attacks (Obama, 2013). The 
framework focuses primarily on cyber challenges, i.e. intellectual property concerns, leaving the 
questions related to cyber-physical vulnerabilities unanswered (NIST, 2014). Therefore, manufacturing 
vulnerabilities are left open to cyber-physical attacks, as there is little to no work being done to connect 
the methodology in the NIST framework to manufacturing facilities. 
Even with the wealth of commercially available cybersecurity assessments and approaches, cyber-
physical security for the manufacturing realm cannot be addressed by these assessments. This paper’s 
proposed approach builds upon the characteristics adopted by the NIST Framework, while focusing on 
concerns that are pertinent to the cyber-physical domain rather than the cyber-domain alone. As 
highlighted in the literature review, there currently exist methods for identifying cyber vulnerabilities 
within an organization. The proposed approach breaks new ground by applying cybersecurity 
vulnerability assessment techniques to cyber-physical systems while providing manufacturers with the 
tools necessary to objectively assess their production processes.  
Using the proposed approach, manufacturers can assess their production facility and identify the 
cyber-physical vulnerabilities inherent to their specific system. The proposed approach will not only 
introduce mitigation techniques and industry best practices, but also towards the creation and 
implementation of a cyber-physical vulnerability assessment tool. 
3 Approach 
With the goal of identifying cyber-physical vulnerabilities within a manufacturing process, the 
proposed vulnerability assessment approach is based upon the principle that vulnerabilities in 
manufacturing systems occur at intersections (and intra-sections, referred to collectively as 
intersections) of cyber, physical, cyber-physical, and human entities that embody a manufacturing 
system. A visual representation of how these entities and vulnerabilities interact within the vulnerability 
space can be seen in Figure 1, where intersections should result in an expected transformation. However, 
the actual transformation could differ from the expected one, even when considering nominal variability 
within the production process; due to the existence of some type of vulnerability. This transformation 
would then act as input to the next intersection and so on. 
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Figure 1: An example of a cyber/human intersection. 
In essence, the developed approach starts by mapping intersections, then assessing the vulnerability 
impact at each intersection node. For complete analysis of a production facility, intersection maps need 
to be created for every part of the manufacturing process to ensure all intersections are accounted for. It 
should be noted that the vulnerability assessment approach proposed here goes beyond malicious cyber-
physical attack vulnerabilities and includes vulnerabilities from unintentional process changes. It is a 
general approach to understand cyber, physical and cyber-physical vulnerabilities existing within a 
system. 
3.1 Intersection Mapping 
The first step of the proposed assessment approach is to track the four different entity types through 
the entire production process. For this purpose, intersection maps are used to identify each entity as it 
progresses through the production process creating a string of related entities that could be easily traced. 
Not only does this step allow the manufacturer to trace these four entities through their production 
process, more importantly it highlights the intersections where cyber-physical vulnerabilities most likely 
occur. The four entities listed below are, cyber, physical, cyber-physical, and human. 
x Cyber: The cyber entity is used for pre-processing, saving, transferring, managing, or post-
processing of digital information. Examples of cyber entities include: Material Requirements 
Planning (MRP) systems, Product Lifecycle Management (PLM) platforms, Enterprise Resource 
Planning (ERP) systems, CAE tools, data management systems, data-mining software, and quality 
control/inspection reporting systems. 
x Physical: A physical entity is one that is tangible in nature and whose role in the manufacturing 
system is not completely governed by automated systems. Examples of physical entities include: 
manufactured parts, manually operated machines, raw/intermediary materials, and manually 
operated inspection equipment. 
x Cyber-Physical: Cyber-physical entities are traced through the production process as well and are 
defined as any entity comprised of cyber and physical elements that autonomously interact together, 
with or without human supervision. Examples of cyber-physical entities include: Computer 
Numerical Control (CNC) machines, Coordinate Measurement Machines (CMMs), data acquisition 
(DAQ) systems, and SCADA networks. 
x Human: In the vulnerability space, a human is defined as any person who has an opportunity to 
interact with other entities within the manufacturing system. Examples of human entities include: 
Information Technology (IT) support staff, designers, manufacturing engineers, machinists, quality 
engineers, maintenance crew members, shipping and handling personnel, and visitors. 
An example of an intersection map can be seen in Figure 2. The example was created to highlight 
the related intersections; but is representative of a process commonly seen in industry, creating a metal 
blank on a CNC machine. The process begins with the interaction between the raw material (partin) and 
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the CNC machine (CNC). It is assumed that the raw material has previously been placed onto the 
machine, outputting an entity (CNCsetup) that would be used as an input for the next node. Once fixed in 
the machine, the machine control language is loaded (G-code) and executed to create the blank part 
(CNCout). Finally, the blank part is reviewed by an inspector (h1) as a visual quality control inspection 
resulting in the finished part (Partout).  
 
Figure 2: An example of a vulnerability intersection map for a manufacturing process. 
Note that each node only consists of two inputs, which allows for a generic analysis of the system. 
The inputs have also been color coded to later identify trends or levels of significance occurring within 
specific types of inputs. Green represents a physical entity in the system, blue represents a cyber-
component, purple represents a cyber-physical component, and finally red represents a human entity. 
3.2 Cyber-Physical Vulnerability Impact Assessment 
For each node within an intersection, its characteristics would then be evaluated to assess its 
corresponding vulnerabilities. These characteristics are used as metrics to determine the impact of 
exploiting this vulnerability. Such intersection characteristics would include: 
a. Loss of Information: The information lost or modified during the completion of a node. For 
example, all of the CAD designer’s information or knowledge of a manufactured part cannot be 
accounted for in the validation of the CAD file; therefore, some information is lost or modified 
when transitioning away from the node with the intersection of the CAD file and the human. 
b. Inconsistency: The level of intersection variability, which can occur due to operator changes, re-
tooling, machine set-ups, etc. For example, a simple operation could be performed in numerous 
ways across different machine and/or operators configurations, resulting in a large range in the 
variation of that certain intersection. 
c. Relative Frequency: The number of times an exact intersection is repeated during the 
manufacturing process. This metric refers to the recurring specific intersection with identical 
details. 
d. Lack of Maturity: The amount of time an intersection has not been in operation. In the case of 
human entities, it could be thought of as the lack of experience or trust; since a novice machinist 
is expected to be less mature than one who has been machining parts for ten years, for example. 
e. Time until Detection: The amount of time elapsed between a node perturbation and its possible 
detection; not necessarily referred to in terms of time, but could be with reference to the distance 
in the process. 
1
CNCsetup
2 3
Partin
CNC
CNCout Partout
G-code h1
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It should be noted that each metric will be ranked low, medium, or high. Low values represent a low 
vulnerability impact and a more secure intersection than one receiving a higher value. Decision trees for 
each of these metrics are created to allow for an easily repeated assessment. Each decision tree for a 
metric poses a question (or a set of questions); it is through answering these different questions that the 
impact level of cyber-physical vulnerabilities is determined. What follows are the details for trees 
corresponding to each of these metrics. 
Loss of Information Metric: 
The first question in the decision process 
for this metric asks whether or not information 
is lost or modified in the node. The 
modification of information or data has the 
potential of a significant negative impact on 
the cyber-physical system. Considering the 
two inputs, has all the information from the 
previous node been carried to this node? Then, 
the next question asks as to whether or not 
information has been gained in this node; as 
shown in Figure 3. For this particular metric, 
each type of intersection (human/human, 
human/cyber, cyber/physical, etc.) should be 
represented by its own unique decision tree. 
However, for the sake of brevity, the decision 
tree for the intersection of only cyber and 
physical entities is presented here. 
Inconsistency Metric: 
Considering that each node of the process map would represent an intersection of two entities or 
resources, the decision here is to determine how many inputs could have changed. An example of this 
would be a change in the operator of a physical machine or the changing of a tool or machine setup; as 
shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: Inconsistency metric decision tree. 
 
Figure 5: Relative Frequency metric decision tree. 
Relative Frequency Metric: 
The decision process for the vulnerability of a node with respect to the relative frequency metric can 
be seen in Figure 5. The metric looks into how many times the specific node is repeated relative to the 
manufacturing process. For example, if a company manufactures only one product, and they produce 
Low Medium High
How Many 
Resources Could 
Have Changed?
0 21
Low Medium High
What is the Relative 
Frequency of This 
Node?
≈0 ≈10<x<1
 
Figure 3: Loss of Information metric decision tree. 
Is Information Lost 
or Modified in This 
Node?
Is Information 
Gained in This 
Node?
Low
Medium High
Yes No
Yes No
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one part a day for an entire year, the frequency of the CAD file creation will be 1/365, which would 
correspond to a relative frequency close to 0 and results in a rating of low. Likewise, the CAM node 
will have a frequency of 1/365. The manufacturing node, however, will have a frequency of 365/365 
due to the daily manufacturing of the part and the relative frequency of the manufacturing node would 
be ≈1, resulting in high rating. 
Lack of Maturity Metric 
The fourth decision tree, shown in Figure 6, answers the questions of lack of maturity of a specific 
node. The first question is whether or not the manufacturer considers the resource 100% trustworthy. 
An example of a non-trusted resource or factor would perhaps be a brand new machine that one is not 
100% comfortable with or fully knowledgeable about. The second question is related to the proficiency 
of this specific resource. 
 
Figure 6: Lack of Maturity metric decision 
tree. 
 
Figure 7: Time until Detection metric decision 
tree. 
Time until Detection Metric 
For the time until detection, it is asked whether or not the effects of the process will eventually be 
inspected. If a process is never going to be inspected, the resulting time until detection results in a high 
level of vulnerability. Second, a question is asked as to how many subsequent nodes until an inspection 
occurs, which determines the amount of time a vulnerability could be exploited; details of this tree are 
shown in Figure 7. 
3.3 Example 
Going back to the example shown in Figure 2, the results of the cyber-physical vulnerability impact 
analysis is summarized in Table 1; where the logic in the described decision trees have been applied to 
yield these results. For instance, it can be seen that the Inconsistency metric for the second node and the 
Loss of Information in the third node show a high rating; while the Relative Frequency metric for all 
three nodes has a high rating. Whereas, the Inconsistency metric for the first node and the Lack of 
Maturity for the second node resulted in a rating of medium. The ratings for the remaining nodes were 
low. These results indicate that there seems to be high variability in the second node, a significant 
Is The Resource 100% 
Trustworthy within 
The Instersection?
Is The Resource 
Proficient in This 
Specific Task?
Low Medium
High
Yes No
NoYes
Low Medium High
Is the Output of the 
Process Inspected?
Number of 
Subsequent Nodes 
Until Inspection?
High
Yes No
0-2 3-5 >5
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amount of important information is lost in the third node, and an issue with the repeatability in all nodes, 
representing potential exploits for cyber-physical attacks within these nodes.  
Table 1: Vulnerability assessment for the metal blanking process in Figure 2. 
# Description 
Loss of 
Information 
Inconsistency 
Relative 
Frequency 
Lack of 
Maturity 
Time until 
Detection 
1 
The CNC (CNC) is loaded 
with the raw material (partin) 
Low Medium High Low Low 
2 
The actual manufacturing 
operation (blanking) on the 
CNC machine. 
Low High High Medium Low 
3 
Resulting product quality is 
assessed by an inspector. High Low High Low Low 
For the sake of clarity, details of the ratings of each metric for the first node, which contains the 
intersection of the part and the CNC machine to create the production setup, are as follows: 
x Loss of information: This metric assesses the vulnerability of the node based on how much 
information is lost or modified during the completion of the node. The first question asks whether 
information is lost or modified when the raw material is fixed into the CNC machine. Since the 
material is information-less and the fixture remains static there is no loss of information, resulting 
in an assessment value of low.  
x Inconsistency: This metric assesses the variability of the node. The first question is whether or 
not the raw material could have changed prior to fixing it in the CNC machine. In this case, it is 
not possible that the raw material was altered. It is asked again, whether or not the CNC machine 
fixture could have changed and the answer is yes (i.e. only one resource could have changed), 
giving the node a medium rating.  
x Relative Frequency: This metric asks whether or not the process is repeated. In this example, 
the process of fixing the raw material into the machine happens every time the production process 
is started, resulting in a high level of relative frequency.  
x Lack of Maturity: This metric assesses the vulnerability of the node, based on the time it has 
not been in operation. It is asked whether or not the resources are trusted, which in this case, are 
the raw material and the CNC machine fixture. It is assumed that they are 100% trustworthy. 
Secondly, it is asked if the resources are proficient in their tasks. We assume that both the CNC 
machine fixture and the raw material are proficient, which corresponds to a lack of maturity rating 
of low. 
x Time Until Detection: This metric measures the distance to an inspection point, which for this 
node is less than two nodes, resulting in a rating of low.   
4 Case Study 
4.1 Overview 
The approach outlined in Section 3 was implemented at the Commonwealth Center for Advanced 
Manufacturing (CCAM) as a case study. CCAM is an applied research center that works with both 
universities and companies to rapidly translate promising research innovation into commercial use 
(CCAM, 2015). The overall goal of the case study was to identify that cyber-physical vulnerabilities 
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exist within a manufacturing facility, which can be exploited by cyber-attacks. Also, those 
vulnerabilities can be easily identified through the careful assessment of a facility’s production process.  
Hence, a part was manufactured at CCAM facilities, going through various phases from the design 
intent to finishing and quality control. These phases included: manufacturing process planning, 
Geometric Dimensioning and Tolerencing (GD&T) and CMM programming, raw material preparation, 
CAM programming, manufacturing, and quality inspection. However, for the purpose of this case study, 
only a select few phases were considered for the implementation of the cyber-physical vulnerability 
assessment. The phases considered are the manufacturing process planning and product quality 
inspection stages. 
Particularly, a phase such as manufacturing process planning consists of two main steps. First, a 
manufacturing setup is created for the part to be produced by the CAD/CAM programmer. The 
programmer’s main job is to make sure the part location, blank geometry, datums, and other process 
characteristics are accurate. The second step is creating a similar setup for the work holding device. This 
is done by a machinist, who finalizes the whole manufacturing setup and selects the suitable work area. 
It should be noted that it is possible for both the programmer and the machinist to collaborate in these 
two steps. The machinist’s input is often valuable and would cause the programmer to re-adjust the 
initial setup accordingly. 
The other phase is the quality inspection phase which consists of three main steps. The first is 
creating a suitable measurement setup on a CMM for the part to be measured. After the measurement 
setup is ready, the part is inspected automatically via the CMM using a pre-specified measurement 
procedure (referred to as the CMM code). Finally, the resulting output data of the CMM is evaluated by 
a CMM operator, to determine whether the part is conforming to the required specifications or not. 
4.2 Intersection Mapping 
As stated in Section 3, the first step was to track the four identified entities (cyber, physical, cyber-
physical, and human) through the production process. This was accomplished through creating 
intersection maps representing different phases within the manufacturing environment at CCAM. For 
instance, Figure 8 shows the intersection map of the manufacturing process planning phase at CCAM, 
where each of the two previously mentioned steps are modeled as two separate nodes (nodes 1 and 2, 
respectively). Figure 9 shows the intersection map for the CCAM’s quality inspection phase, with three 
different nodes representing the different steps within this phase. 
Table 2: Legend used in Figure 8. 
Position Identifier 
CAD Design CAD4 
Manufacturin
g Setups 
MS1, MS2 
CAD/CAM 
Programmer 
h9 
Machinist h12 
Color Entity 
RED Human 
BLUE Cyber 
GREEN Physical 
PURPLE Cyber-Physical 
 
 
Figure 8: Intersection map for the manufacturing process 
planning phase at CCAM. 
1
MS1
2
CAD4
h9
MS2
Revision if necessary
h12
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4.3 Cyber-Physical Vulnerability Impact Assessment 
Upon completion of the intersection mapping, the next step is to apply the logic in the different 
decision trees to assess the vulnerability of each node. For the manufacturing process planning phase, 
the results are summarized in Table 4, where each of the two nodes has its resulting metric value (color-
coded) from the cyber-physical vulnerability assessment approach. According to Table 4, there are three 
metrics that show high ratings for both of the nodes in this stage: Inconsistency, Relative Frequency, 
and Time until Detection. In addition, the Loss of Information metric for the first node has a high rating. 
Only one other metric provides a medium rating for the second node, which is the Loss of Information 
metric, while all the remaining metrics’ rating is low for both nodes. 
Table 4: Vulnerability assessment for the manufacturing process planning phase. 
# Description 
Loss of 
Information 
Inconsistency 
Relative 
Frequency 
Lack of 
Maturity 
Time until 
Detection 
1 
Programmer (h9) creates 
part (CAD4) setup (MS1). 
High High High Low High 
2 
Machinist (h13) finalizes 
the setup (MS1). 
Medium High High Low High 
As for the product quality inspection phase, the cyber-physical vulnerability assessment results are 
shown in Table 5. It seems that the Relative Frequency metric is always yielding a high rating, regardless 
in which node, while the Inconsistency metric has a rating of medium in both the first and third nodes. 
Other than another medium rating for the Loss of Information metric in the third node, all the remaining 
metrics provide low ratings for all remaining nodes.   
Table 5: Vulnerability assessment for the quality inspection phase. 
# Description 
Loss of 
Information 
Inconsistency 
Relative 
Frequency 
Lack of 
Maturity 
Time until 
Detection 
1 
Creating a measurement 
setup (CMMsetup) on the 
CMM. 
Low Medium High Low Low 
Table 3: Legend used in Figure 9. 
Position 
Produced 
Part 
CMM 
Machine 
CMM with 
Part Mounted 
on it 
CMM Code to be 
Input into the 
CMM 
CMM 
Output Data 
CMM 
Operator 
Inspected 
Part 
Identifier Part1 CMM CMMsetup CMMcode CMMout h14 Partout 
 
 
Figure 9: Intersection map for the quality inspection phase at CCAM. 
1
CMMsetup
2 3
Partin
CMM
CMMout Partout
CMMcode h14
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# Description 
Loss of 
Information 
Inconsistency 
Relative 
Frequency 
Lack of 
Maturity 
Time until 
Detection 
2 
Actual part measurement, 
resulting in (CMMout). 
Low Low High Low Low 
3 
Inspection results evaluation 
by a CMM operator. Medium Medium High Low Low 
4.4 Interpreting the Results 
From the ratings obtained in both Table 4 and Table 5, it can be concluded that there exists 
vulnerabilities in the manufacturing environment used for this case study. More specifically, both nodes 
in the manufacturing process planning phase have three out of five metrics with a high rating. Moreover, 
the first node shows an additional high rating metric, while the second node also shows a metric with a 
medium rating. The situation is somewhat better for the product quality inspection phase from a 
vulnerability assessment standpoint. Only one metric yields a high rating in all three stages. The results 
also show that the nodes for this phase seem to be having a varying pattern of vulnerability risks with 
the third node being slightly more vulnerable to cyber-physical attacks and the second node being the 
least vulnerable.  
This implies that the identified production process contains nodes that are vulnerable to cyber-
physical attacks. Nodes earning a high ranking denote a portion of the production process that is 
extremely vulnerable to exploitation through cyber-physical attacks and could compromise an entire 
production system if not mitigated. Such an assessment indicates that processes within this facility that 
are comprised of the intersection between cyber and physical entities are highly vulnerable to cyber-
attacks. The phenomenon seen here highlights the need for cyber-physical vulnerability assessment in 
manufacturing.  
Using the vulnerability assessment tool to highlight these intersections and overall level of cyber-
physical vulnerability will aid manufacturers in securing their production systems from attack. The 
vulnerability assessment performed for CCAM’s manufacturing facility outlines the need for cyber-
physical security to be a more widely discussed topic in manufacturing. The proposed vulnerability 
assessment highlights areas of potential improvement to better secure the production system from cyber-
physical attacks. 
The largest vulnerability areas from the case study are the Inconsistency and Relative Frequency 
metrics. To mitigate these risks, CCAM needs to decrease the number of resources that could be altered 
within a node and the number of times the node is repeated. To decrease the number of resources that 
could have changed within a node, the authors suggest that version control be implemented with a chain 
of certification for files. This would allow the necessary individuals to alter the files while providing a 
chain of certification as to who has changed which attributes within the files. Altering the manufacturing 
production process is required to decrease the number of times a node is repeated, eliminate 
redundancies, and to only allow the necessary operations to occur once. It was suggested to produce 
blank parts in batches to reduce the number of potential attack opportunities on the CNC machine. This 
can also be accomplished through designing parts only once, and not altering design files after a process 
setup has been created.  
5 Discussion and Future Work 
The proposed cyber-physical vulnerability assessment approach provides manufacturers with a 
detailed outline to identify cyber-physical vulnerabilities. Where identified vulnerabilities are instances 
that pose a significant risk to their manufacturing production process if left unidentified. The proposed 
approach mainly consisted of two steps. First, representing various processes within a manufacturing 
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setting as intersection maps of different entity types. Then, using decision tree analysis to evaluate the 
impact of vulnerabilities in each of the resulting intersection nodes is assessed. This assessment is a step 
in the right direction for manufacturers to begin to take cyber-physical security seriously. The literature 
has shown that this area of risk is left untouched by other assessments, while the number and complexity 
of attacks on manufacturers continues to increase.  
Upon applying the proposed vulnerability assessment approach to the production process used in 
the case study many areas of improvement were identified that would allow this approach to be 
developed further into a full cyber-physical vulnerability assessment tool. Used to detect cyber-physical 
vulnerabilities within a manufacturing system, the proposed tool would also provide manufacturers with 
a detailed plan including mitigation strategies to secure the identified production process from cyber-
physical attacks. 
The first area identified for future work is the area of threat identification. The proposed approach 
only identifies cyber-physical vulnerabilities. It is expected to extend this approach to determine the 
likelihood of each threat from previous data collected from customer discovery and through the analysis 
of threats seen commonly in industry. The second area aims to equip the assessment approach with risk 
assessment capability. This capability would allow the assessment to identify the likelihood of the cyber-
physical vulnerability being exploited and multiplying that number by the potential impact given by the 
manufacturer, providing them with an individualized risk assessment. Lastly, the main goal is to 
eventually incorporate all of these ideas into one package creating an easy-to-use cyber-physical 
vulnerability assessment tool to identify vulnerabilities within manufacturing production processes by 
analyzing input from manufacturers.  
The incorporation of the vulnerability assessment tools into a single package would best be served 
as an audit based tool. This audit tool would be semi-automated in that the manufacturer would be 
required to input certain information regarding their production processes and the tool would do the 
analysis, significantly reducing the amount of time and effort required of the manufacturer. The aim 
would be asking the minimum amount of manual input from the manufacturers, to be able to provide 
them with a complete assessment, along with areas of higher risks that require more attention. 
As previously mentioned, in addition to the NIST Framework, other organizations have also 
embarked on alternate solutions to cybersecurity such as creating audit tools that protect critical 
infrastructure by allowing companies to secure their critical assets from cyber-attacks (Bergvall & 
Svensson, 2012). However, most of their work has been directed towards securing assets and proprietary 
information, which has resulted in their expertise and contributions being relegated solely to the 
cybersecurity market, leaving the cyber-physical market untouched (Fray, 2012). Contributing to the 
cyber-physical market requires a more robust approach that includes working with industry partners, 
gaining insights into the limitations of manufacturing enterprises, and developing an organization-
specific assessment approach that caters to the needs of the various manufacturing enterprises. The 
future work aims to bridge the gap between assessment tools and cyber-physical security for 
manufacturing by creating a cyber-physical vulnerability assessment tool. 
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